Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities

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Rwanda

Capsule Summary
Country name: Republic of Rwanda (Rwandese Republic)
Location: Central Africa (bordering Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi)
Total Population: 7,810,056 (July 2003 estimate)
Ethnic Populations: Hutu (Bahutu), 85%; Tutsi (Batutsi), 14%; Twa (Batwa), <1%
Languages: Kinyarwanda (official) universal Bantu vernacular, French (official), English (official), Kiswahili (Swahili) used in commercial centers
Religions: Roman Catholic 56.5%, Protestant 26%, Adventist 11.1%, Muslim 4.6%, indigenous beliefs 0.1%, none 1.7% (2001)

The Republic of Rwanda, known as the "land of a thousand hills" is located just south of the equator in East-Central Africa. At 26,340 square kilometers, it is slightly smaller than Maryland and borders Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda. This beautiful, mountainous country is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, and the vast majority of the population lives as subsistence agriculturalists. Its major exports are coffee and tea, and deforestation and soil erosion are major problems. Since 1994, the government has been engaged in major infrastructure projects, and as a result, the road system is quite good by African standards. One of the world's poorest countries that is almost entirely dependent upon agriculture, Rwanda's GDP per capita income was just $1,200 in 2002.

Rwanda is a country with a troubled history of ethnic violence and genocide, particularly since the independence era. The deliberate killing of the Tutsi ethnic group, in an effort to eliminate them completely, has been attempted on more than one occasion by the majority Hutus since 1959. Rwanda and neighboring Burundi are two of the few African states whose borders were not arbitrarily created by the colonists at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. Prior to colonization, each was an independent Tutsi kingdom. During pre-colonial times, Tutsi and Hutu were more fluid categories based on occupation with Tutsis living as pastoralists and Hutus as agriculturalists. In fact, though the Tutsis were dominant and formed the warrior-aristocracy, Hutus could become Tutsis by gaining wealth while Tutsis who fell on hard times could become Hutus (Dravis, 1996). The Twa are the original inhabitants of the forests of Rwanda, Uganda and Congo. They make up less than 1% of Rwanda's population and have played a minimal role in the economy and political system.

History
Germany was the first European power to colonize Rwanda (1899), but it turned over the territory to Belgium in 1917 following its defeat in World War I. It was under Belgian colonial rule that ethnic divisions became defined and the categorization of Tutsi and Hutu became more rigid. In the 1930s, the Belgian colonial government issued identity cards that included rigidly defined ethnic affiliations in an effort to more easily control the people. The Belgians also sought to centralize control over Rwanda by instituting a uniform system of rule that eliminated pockets of autonomy, some of which were Hutu-controlled, that had existed under the traditional Tutsi kingdom. The Belgian government was particularly neglectful of the people under its colonial administrations. Rwandans were not provided much education, nor was the infrastructure or a viable economy developed under the colonial government.

The rigid view of unchanging ethnic identity came to be adopted by Hutu extremists who initiated and directed the Genocide of 1994. As David Newbury points out, this view is based on "a biological model of social classifications" that is seriously called into question by the historical facts (Newbury, 1997: 213). In fact, Hutus and Tutsis have long shared a common culture, religion and language, and prior to colonization, conflicts that occurred were about the process of state formation and power, and more often occurred within ethnic groups than between them (Newbury, 1997: 213).

In the mid-1950s, the Belgian colonial administration reversed its policy of supporting the Tutsi hierarchy and began to support the Hutu majority who demanded a more democratic system of governance. Tutsi elites began agitating for immediate independence while the Hutu elites sided with the Belgians in demanding a transition period in which educated Hutu leaders would take power followed by full independence. From 1959-1961, Hutu leaders carried out a mass-killing of the Tutsi in which 20-100,000 were killed and after which thousands fled. By 1964, 300,000 Rwandan refugees were registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Congo (Kimonyo, 2000). It was the children and grandchildren of these refugees who returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide to reclaim the government.

Independence
Rwanda's first president in 1961 was Grégoire Kayibanda, and his government was dominated by Hutus from the central and southern regions of the country. A massacre of Hutus in neighboring Burundi in which some 100,000-300,000 Hutus were killed triggered a slaughter of Tutsis in 1972-73 in Rwanda. In order to restore peace, the Rwandan military took over the government in 1973. Unlike Rwanda, independence in Burundi did not lead to a transition of power from the Tutsis to the Hutus. The Tutsi elites in Burundi managed to maintain power through force, and this circumstance was a constant factor in shaping Rwandan politics over the past four decades. Burundi was seen as a threatening example of what might happen in Rwanda if the Hutu elites allowed the Tutsis to gain power. The July 1973 coup in Rwanda brought Major General Juvenal Habyarimana to power. From this time until the end of the genocide in 1994, the government was dominated by Northern Hutus, particularly from the Gisenyi region. The main political actors, known as the akazu ("household") were Habyarimana, his wife Agathe and her brothers, and a handful of trusted advisors. Over time, not only did Habyarimana's closed style of rule alienate the Tutsis, it also alienated Hutu elites from other regions.

During the mid-late 1980s, two factors contributed to the weakening of the Habyarimana regime. First, the economy began to decline due to a deterioration in terms of trade and a decrease in external economic aid. Second, external forces began to press African regimes in general for greater openness and increased political participation for the population. On top of these pressures, Habyarimana was threatened by an invasion of Tutsi rebels from neighboring Uganda in 1990.

Masses of Tutsis fled Rwanda after the 1959 Hutu revolution and the 1973 massacres, and they were discouraged from returning home by the Habyarimana regime. A new generation of Rwandans, some of mixed Rwandan and other parentage, grew up in neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Congo. Many of the exiled Rwandans in Uganda were instrumental in the fight against the dictatorships of Idi Amin and Milton Obote during the 1970s and 1980s. Some Tutsi soldiers, like current Rwandan President Paul Kagame, came to be highly ranked within the Ugandan military after Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986. After some years in favor in the Ugandan military, Rwandan Tutsi soldiers began to be resented by their Ugandan counterparts. In addition, the economy of Uganda was faltering, so Ugandans were growing discontented with the large Rwandan population living there. These factors, combined with the repressive rule of the Habyarimana regime contributed to the establishment of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987 and its invasion of Rwanda in October 1990. The initial invasion by the RPF was repulsed by the Rwandan army (Armed Forces of Rwanda, FAR) with assistance from troops from Zaire and monetary assistance from France and Belgium. Over the course of the following two years, the RPF was able to continue launching invasions into Rwanda. The insurgency was serious enough for the Habyarimana government to eventually agree to peace talks with the rebels. Between August 1993 and January 1994, the government and RPF agreed to two power-sharing arrangements. The RPF was to gain a certain number of cabinet positions within the government and integrate its soldiers into FAR. Extremist Hutus within the government of Rwanda were vehemently opposed to any power-sharing arrangement with the RPF, and clashes broke out between different factions of the government.

Genocide
In April 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira was shot down over Kigali. Most analysts blame Rwandan Hutu extremists for the assassination of the presidents. What is clear is that the assassination of the presidents was the signal to Hutus extremists (Interahamwe or "those who fight together") to begin their genocidal campaign against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwanda. In just 100 days, between 500,000-800,000 Rwandans were killed. The genocide was highly organized by a core group of Hutu extremists who spread their message of hate and vengeance via leaflets, the radio, and word of mouth. Neighbors were exhorted to kill neighbors, husbands to kill their in-laws, children to kill their teachers or vice versa. Some people were forced to kill or be killed by the leaders of the genocide, while others adopted the Hutu power ideology as their own and believed they must kill in order to survive. Most people were killed using simple tools such as machetes, though there were also incidents of grenades being launched into churches harboring people or people sheltering in schools being burned alive. No community was left untouched by the genocide. Up to 80% of the Rwandan Tutsis living in the country at the time were wiped out. Untold numbers of Hutus were also killed.

The international community was reluctant to stop the Rwandan genocide through military intervention. At the time of the Arusha accords in August 1993, the UN had agreed to send a number of troops to Rwanda in order to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. Twenty-five hundred UN troops were deployed in November 1993 with a mandate that did not include peace-making or the ability to intervene to stop attacks by either side in the conflict. Hence, the force was ineffective when the genocide was launched in April 1994. Western countries pulled their citizens out of the country but did nothing to stop the slaughter of Rwandans. The U.S. government was reluctant to call the massacre genocide because by law it would have been required to intervene, and it was reluctant to do so after the failed intervention in Somalia just six months before in which 17 U.S. soldiers were killed and 75 injured. The French and Belgians had long been supportive of the Habyarimana regime, and did nothing to stop the genocide once it began. The U.N. did not give its peace-keepers in Rwanda an expanded mandate after the killings began even though U.N. leaders knew ahead of time that the genocide had been planned. The failure of the international community has since been acknowledged by nearly every government and international organization that failed to act.

The genocide was halted in July 1994 by the RPF. They captured a number of the leaders of the genocide, but many also fled to neighboring Zaire. In addition, approximately two million Hutus also fled Rwanda after the RPF put a halt to the killing. Many feared revenge attacks by the RPF, and many others had actually taken part in the genocide. The refugee flow to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) soon became a humanitarian emergency and the international community responded with aid and assistance. The refugees remained in Zaire, many against their will threatened by Hutu militias, until late 1996. Between mid-1994 and late-1996, the Hutu extremists who had fled Rwanda continued to launch invasions into the country, especially in the northwest, from the relative safety of the refugee camps. In September 1996, a rebellion was launched in eastern Zaire after the local governor ordered Congolese Tutsis out of the country. It was only after this rebellion began that the Rwandan refugees began to return home, largely because Rwandan forces began attacking the refugee camps looking for Rwandan Interahamwe and ex-FAR. For the most part, the refugees who returned to Rwanda were not subject to revenge attacks by the Rwandan government, though countless thousands were killed in the fighting in eastern Zaire.

The insurgency within Rwanda was quashed by the end of 1998, and the country has not experienced open conflict since that time. Unfortunately, the threat of ethnic conflict in Rwanda remains strong. First, extremist Hutus continue to promote an ideology of hatred. They are mainly based in eastern Congo where they are currently being supported by the Congolese government. Rwanda and Uganda both have troops in eastern Congo for security reasons. They are unlikely to pull out until the Congolese government stops supporting rebel groups who want to topple their respective governments. Congo, for its part, is supported by Angola and Zimbabwe. Angola has legitimate security reasons for its participation in the Congo civil war while Zimbabwe has received economic benefits from allying itself with the government. The conflict is unlikely to be resolved soon, though the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 might help the peace process along. Kabila was largely responsible for blocking the Congo peace process.

In early 2001, Rwanda remains relatively peaceful, and the government has instituted a number of measures to ensure peace and stability within its borders. Though the government is unlikely to allow popular participation in general elections, it is trying to promote unity and reconciliation within its borders. One of its greatest challenges is bringing to justice more than 120,000 genocide suspects who are currently in Rwandan jails. Those accused of masterminding the genocide are being tried under the established justice system. However, the established institutions do not have the capacity to handle the entire caseload of suspects, so the government has adopted laws to create gacaca or community courts. These courts are based on a traditional system of justice that allows the local communities to determine the guilt or innocence of persons accused of crimes. The process of trying the genocide suspects in these community-based courts had not yet begun in early 2001. The trial of genocide suspects will likely put great pressure on Rwanda's civil society, and whether justice, as perceived by both sides in the conflict, is carried out will largely determine the stability and reconciliation of the country.

In April 2004 the Rwandan government literally outlawed ethnicity, claiming that ethnic tensions could only be ameliorated by erasing the very categorization that marks the Hutu and the Tutsi as different. The government, which is currently dominated by the minority Tutsi, has wiped out the distinctions by decree, employing re-education camps to instruct its citizens on the new "no-ethnicity" policy. Discussions of ethnicity have been removed from school textbooks and government identification cards. Rwanda's government-controlled radio, television and newspapers similarly avoid ethnic terminology. The new crime of "divisionism"-which can include provocative speech about ethnicity-is punishable by law and can land offenders in jail. Unlike Burundi, which has suffered similar violence and has nearly the same ethnic makeup, Rwanda has chosen to eradicate ethnicity rather than create a forum for dialogue in which its painful history might be healed.

Anne Pitsch

See also Burundi; Congo; Genocide; Tutsi; Twa; Uganda

Further Reading

Dravis, Michael, "Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda," Working paper of the Minorities at Risk Project directed by Dr. Ted Robert Gurr, University of Maryland, 1996 (update 1998). http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/rwanda.htm

Gourevitch, Philip, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998.

Kimonyo, Jean Paul, "Causes of the Rwandan Genocide and Beyond," Conference Paper Conflict and Peace-making in the Great Lakes Region, Entebbe, Uganda. 2000. Paper available from the Center for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda.

Lemarchand, Rene, Rwanda and Burundi, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.

Newbury, Catherine, The Cohesion of Oppression : Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Newbury, David, "Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa," Africa Today, 44, no. 2, (1997).

Uvin, Peter, Development, Aid and Conflict: Reflections from Rwanda, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland, 1996.

Uvin, Peter, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda," Comparative Politics, 31, no. 3, (April 1999).

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