Sample
Entry 3
Social
Democracy
Perhaps the
most striking characteristic of Scandinavian politics since 1945
has been the strength and influence of social democracy. The social
democratic parties of Denmark (Socialdemokratiet, SD), Norway
(Det norske Arbeiderpartiet, DNA) and especially Sweden (Sveriges
socialdemokratiska arbetarparti, SAP) have enjoyed long periods
in office, and up to the 1970s consistently polled high percentages
of the popular vote. Scandinavian social democracy has attracted
considerable international attention, not only on account of its
electoral success, but also for the supposed distinctiveness of
its ideology and policy, and in particular its contribution to
the construction of the Scandinavian *welfare state. Social democratic
parties in Finland (Suomen sosialdemokraattinen puolue), and Iceland
(Alþýðuflokkur) have been rather less influential,
partly because of the strength of the *communist left in these
countries. The average popular vote gained by the Scandinavian
social democratic parties is shown in Table 1:
Table 1: Average percentage share of popular vote gained by social
democratic parties in Scandinavia, 1945-2002
| |
Average
percentage share of vote |
|
|
|
|
| |
Denmark |
Finland |
Iceland |
Norway |
Sweden |
| 1945-2002 |
35.59 |
24.88 |
14.91 |
37.78 |
44.11 |
| 1940-1971 |
39.30 |
|
|
45.50 |
47.60 |
(Figures
for Finland and Iceland are for 1945-95. Source: Arter, D. (1999)
Scandinavian Politics Today, Manchester: Manchester University
Press.)
Not
surprisingly, these parties can also claim to have dominated the
governments of the period. The SAP, as is well known, enjoyed
an unbroken run of 44 years in office between 1932 and 1976. The
party governed alone during the period 1945-76, with the exception
of 1951-57 when a coalition was formed with the Agrarian Party.
The DNA was in government continuously between 1945 and 1965,
and SD was in government (albeit usually in coalition) from 1947
to 1968, with the exception of a brief period out of office in
1950-53.
The social democratic parties
of Finland and Iceland are less easy to fit into a general Scandinavian
model of social democracy, although it should be noted that both
of these parties negotiated agreements with *agrarian parties
during the 1930s and entered red-green coalitions very similar
to their counterparts in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. However,
the social democratic parties have been much less influential
during the post-war period. In Finland the social democratic party
has lost out to the radical left, which gained a much higher percentage
share of the popular vote than its counterparts elsewhere in Scandinavia,
perhaps partly as a legacy of the Civil War. Post-war Finland
has therefore tended to be governed by broad *coalitions, and
social democracy has not shared the influence over policy of SD,
DNA and SAP. The radical left has also enjoyed strong support
in Iceland, although here the broad political consensus has lain
to the right of centre, based on the strength of the *Independence
Party. For this reason the following overview is concerned with
the social democratic parties of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
The Scandinavian social democratic
parties were founded in the late nineteenth century as mass working-class
parties in response to the social and political upheavals associated
with industrialization. They shared two characteristics with the
other European working-class parties emerging at this time: a
democratic organisational structure which relied heavily on the
support of trade unions; and an ideology derived in part from
the Marxist analysis of capitalism and class struggle. The parties
have, until very recently, remained closely tied to the *trade
union federations (LO). The German Social Democratic Party was
a formative influence on Scandinavian social democracy, but the
parties also incorporated other traditions of popular protest
into their ideology. The Scandinavian social democratic parties
split with the revolutionary left in the aftermath of the Bolshevik
revolution of 1917, and joined the Socialist International (the
exception here was the DNA, which was a member of the Comintern
from 1920-1927). From the 1920s, they have all, therefore, maintained
an explicit commitment to the parliamentary, reformist route to
socialism. With the advent of universal suffrage, the social democratic
parties were able to increase their parliamentary representation
substantially, and in some cases had formed short-lived minority
governments before 1930. But the real breakthrough came in the
1930s, when all five Scandinavian social democratic parties were
able to negotiate compromise agreements with agrarian parties,
and thus secure the parliamentary support necessary to allow them
to form majority governments, and introduce welfare reforms and
some degree of counter-cyclical economic policy.
In Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
the two decades after 1945 can with some justification be described
as the 'golden age' of social democracy. Social democratic parties
were in government for most of this period, and presided over
an era of high rates of economic growth, low unemployment and
rising living standards. (see economic development). In common
with other west European social democratic parties, by 1945 the
Scandinavian parties had all but abandoned their programmatic
commitment to Marxism. While some scholars argue that this amounted
to extreme ideological pragmatism, others maintain that nonetheless
some distinctive elements of Scandinavian social democratic ideology
were retained. These include:
- Commitment
to *equality and social solidarity through universal and comprehensive
welfare benefits, and a redistributive *taxation system.
- Commitment
to the mixed economy; toleration of a relatively large private
sector, and full employment as the principal goal of economic
policy.
- Strong
state viewed as benign and desirable in constructing 'good society'
and maximising individual freedom.
For
all three parties, the core policy aims were therefore the maintenance
of full employment, and the promotion of social justice and equality.
The further development of an efficient industrial sector was
a key element of this, especially in Denmark, but the nationalisation
of industry was never regarded as a major policy tool. In Sweden,
the central economic policy was the so-called *Rehn-Meidner model,
which sought to promote economic efficiency and social justice
through state intervention in the labour market, notably the *'solidaristic'
wage policy. The most celebrated aspect of social democratic policy
however was the further expansion of the welfare state, and the
related concept of the 'people's home' or folkhemmet associated
with Swedish social democracy. There were clear influences from
abroad in the development of Scandinavian welfare policy -- the
1943 Beveridge Report in the UK for example -- but the writings
and researches of a core group of social democratic intellectuals,
especially in Sweden, began to attract widespread international
attention from the 1930s.
Why was social democracy so electorally dominant in post-war Sweden,
Denmark and Norway? Most political scientists have pointed to
the ability of the social democratic parties to look beyond their
'traditional' constituency -- i.e. industrial workers -- for electoral
support, and to forge cross-class alliances, most notably with
agrarian interests. Others have cited the way in which the SAP
in particular has been able to institutionalise its power base
once in office, for example through its economic policies designed
to benefit all wage earners, and thus attract the support of 'white
collar' workers. Any explanation of social democratic dominance
would also have to take into account the social democrats' cultural
hegemony within post-war Scandinavia, and their ability to create
a stable consensus around their core values and policies.
By the early 1970s however there were signs that the electoral
dominance of social democracy was beginning to wane. SD suffered
a major electoral defeat in Denmark's 'earthquake election' in
1973, which must be partly attributed to the severe impact of
the international economic crisis in Denmark. Then in 1976 the
SAP lost its first parliamentary election in nearly half a century,
brought about partly by the party's failure to address concerns
over *nuclear energy. From the mid 1960s social democracy had
faced a renewed challenge from the left, which stemmed partly
(in Norway and Denmark) from opposition to deeper involvement
in international organisations (*NATO and the *EEC), but more
broadly from the emergence of the so-called *'new left'. Many
felt that social democracy had lost its radical edge, and had
become merely the manager of the affluent society. In response,
both SD and the SAP made some attempt to re-radicalise their policies.
SD adopted a new party programme in 1977 which marked a major
shift to the left, and re-introduced the critique of capitalism
conspicuously absent from the 1961 programme. The SAP meanwhile
embarked on an ambitious programme to achieve economic democracy
through its *wage earner funds, while simultaneously pursuing
a markedly critical line in foreign policy, the 'active neutrality'.
(see internationalism; neutrality). But there were also political
challenges from the right, in particular in Denmark and Norway
with the emergence of the populist Progressive Parties in the
early 1970s, and their critique of certain key areas of social
democratic policy, notably high taxation and high levels of public
spending. (see protest parties). Consequently, since the 1970s
all three social democratic parties have been more concerned,
when in power, with seeking to consolidate and defend what they
regard as the major achievements of the post-war era, notably
the welfare state.
The SAP returned to power in 1982, and for a while it appeared
that in Sweden and Norway at least the social democratic parties
had successfully met the challenges of the 1970s, under the leadership
of Olof *Palme and Gro Harlem *Brundtland respectively. SD, meanwhile,
faced an extended period in opposition during the 1980s. The assassination
of Palme in Stockholm in 1986 was of course an enormous shock
for the SAP, and to Swedish political culture more generally.
But this probably had less of an impact on the party than the
severe economic crisis which Sweden was facing by the late 1980s.
The social democratic prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson, introduced
a package of crisis policies, but resigned in February 1990 when
he failed to secure the support of LO, and at the election the
following year the SAP recorded its worst election result since
1928.
During the 1990s, the percentage share of the vote for both DNA
and SD has declined still further, and neither can now really
be taken for granted as a governing party. DNA in particular remains
split over the issue of EU membership, as it has been since the
1960s, and has also faced challenges from *environmentalists in
the debate over what to do with Norway's oil earnings. (see North
Sea oil). SD was thrown onto the defensive by its long period
in opposition during the 1980s, which allowed *neo-liberal ideas
perhaps to gain more of an ascendancy in Denmark than they did
in the rest of Scandinavia. SD responded by producing a new, catch
all manifesto in 1992, followed by a major organisational reform
of the party in 1996, but it has not been able to improve its
performance enough to stave off the challenge from the populist
right. The issue of the EU, and especially the single currency,
remains divisive for SD, as it also does for the SAP. The SAP
has performed rather better, but even so many critics suggest
that there has been a marked watering down of the party's ideology
and policies under its current leader Göran Persson.
If the Scandinavian social democratic parties have lost much of
their distinctiveness in terms of ideology, then most scholars
would agree that this is probably the case as far as the organisation
of the parties is concerned as well. By the early 1970s it was
clear that social democracy's traditional core of support -- industrial
workers, small farmers and agrarian workers -- was in decline.
The party membership was ageing, and the parties seemed to be
failing to attract new members from two important groups within
the electorate, namely women and public sector workers. Despite
concerted efforts to regenerate the grassroots, there were concerns
in all three parties that the party organisation was becoming
increasingly dominated by a political elite. This trend was exacerbated
by the introduction of public subsidies for political parties,
which meant that parties were less reliant on their supporters,
and by the decline in the affiliated institutions -- sports and
social clubs, co-operative societies, youth clubs, women's associations
and above all the trade union movement -- which had made social
democracy an entire way of life for some since the 1920s. Indeed,
during the 1990s all three parties have made moves towards cutting
their traditional close ties with the trade union movement. At
the same time they have placed less emphasis on grassroots support
and activism in their political campaigning, and have relied instead
on communicating the party's message through the mass media. In
common with other political parties, the personality of the leader
and his or her 'image' is emphasised as much as -- perhaps more
than -- the party's ideology and policies.
The recent decline in the
electoral performance of the social democratic parties has prompted
a reappraisal of the influence of social democracy on twentieth
century Scandinavia. Many scholars have shown a renewed interest
in the influence of other currents on areas such as the welfare
state, such as the role of *Lutheranism and of *liberalism, and
the contribution of a broad political *consensus to constructing
the post-war Scandinavian 'model' of policy and politics. Meanwhile,
the social democratic contribution has been subjected to more
critical scrutiny, and some less savoury aspects of the social
democracy have been exposed, such as the enthusiasm among some
social democrats for *eugenicist policies during the 1930s and
afterwards. That said, few would deny that social democracy has
had a very significant impact on twentieth century Scandinavia.
Moreover, this impact has not been confined merely to the political
sphere. The influence of social democracy has also had a major
impact on Scandinavian culture more broadly understood. In particular
it could be said to have generated its own literature, from the
'proletarian' writers of the 1930s (e.g. Moa *Martinson, Ivar
*Lo-Johansson) to the recent emergence of authors of texts concerning
with re-appraising the 'folkhemmet' and other aspects of social
democratic Scandinavia (e.g. Ingvar *Ambjörnsen, Lena Andersson,
Torbjörn *Flygt).
Further reading:
Ladrech, R. and Marlière, P. (eds) (1999) Social democratic
parties in the European Union: history, organisation, policies,
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Anderson, P. and Camiller, P. (eds) (1994) Mapping the west European
left, London: Verso.
Misgeld, K., Molin, K., and Åmark, K (eds) (1992) Creating
Social Democracy: A century of the Social Democratic Labor Party
in Sweden, University Park: Pennsylvania University Press.
Mary Hilson
2,364 words
